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1 Introduction and aim of study 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Regional integration and common values 
As models of regional integration, the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) are two prominent examples. Regionalisation has become an 
increasingly important phenomenon and can be seen as a consequence of or a reaction to the 
ongoing globalization process, with increased mobility of people, goods and capital beyond 
national borders.1 Regional integration and interaction between regions also constitute an 
alternative to the global multilateral cooperation, as shown by the increased regional activity 
with regard to free trade as a consequence of the lack of progress in the multilateral trade 
negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO). If a regional organization is to 
integrate, i.e. moving beyond mere cooperation, there must be a shared set of standards 
between the member states, allowing them to confide in each other. This is particularly the 
case if the integration is to deepen into more sensitive areas. Furthermore, when a regional 
entity’s policies affect areas where it can be hard for the member states to distinguish the 
direct economic or political gain of deeper integration, something else is required in order for 
the process to be viable. A shared sense of identity and solidarity in the region, founded on 
common values can serve as the glue of deeper integration and is necessary in order to build a 
true people’s community or union.2 Which these values are, what role they play in the 
integration process and how they are enforced differ widely between the EU and ASEAN. 
However, the question of common fundamental principles, or values, interlinked with the 
notion of regional identity is going to play an important role for the future course of 
integration in both regions.  
 
The comparative analysis of EU and ASEAN that will be made in this thesis has to be seen 
against the background of the increasing interaction and mutual interest between the two 
regions. EU was the first dialogue partner of ASEAN and the cooperation between the regions 
has widened and deepened over the years. In 2007, the Nuremberg Declaration on an 
                                                 
1
 Lindberg 2007 p 1 
2
 Compare Ward p 260 ”For a political community to flourish, to engage and to maintain the affinity of its 
citizens, it must project a convincing and compelling public philosophy. It must stand for certain values, legal 
and economic certainly, but also moral, political, perhaps even spiritual.”  
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ASEAN-EU Enhanced partnership was signed, encompassing plans for future cooperation in 
the political, economic, environmental and socio-cultural field.3 The economic interest of both 
regions to cooperate further is seen as substantial and negotiations on an ASEAN-EU Free 
trade agreement (FTA) have been launched, albeit without any actual negotiations this far.4 In 
the political area, ASEAN encourages EU to play a greater role in Southeast Asia since this 
would create a geopolitical balance in the region.5 This is mirrored by the increased European 
interest in Asia and ASEAN during the 90’s, as reflected in several policy documents.6 
Furthermore, ASEAN and EU interact in multilateral fora such as the WTO, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF),7 and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).8 The interaction on a region-
to-region level is supplemented by bilateral contacts between the EU and individual ASEAN 
member states, where renewed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA’s) currently 
are being negotiated. ASEAN and EU thus want to develop their relations further. Differences 
in systems and internal values between EU and ASEAN can affect these relations, especially 
given the value promotion of the EU in its external policies.  
1.1.2 The European integration experience 
The formation of the European Communities (EC) and the subsequent development into the 
Union can only be properly assessed in the light of WWII. The EC was originally a peace 
project to help build confidence between the member states and consolidate the region against 
external threats. At the time, there was an intra-European opinion in favour of increased 
cooperation between the European states. 9 However, the idea of European Unity was not 
new, but had been reoccurring in Europe ever since the first modern civilizations.10 Preceding 
the community treaties, different forms of European cooperation were formed in the 
aftermaths of the war. The USA was pushing for cooperation in Europe in order to safeguard 
their strategic interests. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECC, later 
OECD) was set up in order to administer the Marshall aid from the USA. There was also 
cooperation within the defence field, notably by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 
                                                 
3
 http://www.aseansec.org/20693.pdf  
4
 Compare e.g. COM (2003) 399 p 8ff and the status report by Lindberg 2007 p 17, showing that the trade 
between EU and ASEAN has increased dramatically in actual figures during the last decades, although it is 
declining in relative terms.  
5
 Compare Yeo p 10f 
6
 Towards a New Asia Strategy (1996), Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for Enhanced Partnerships 
(2001) and A new partnership with Southeast Asia (2003).  
7
 ARF is a forum for dialogue on political and security matters in the Asia-Pacific. 
8
 ASEM is a multilateral dialogue between Europe and East Asia and an open forum for global issues. 
9
 Cramér 1994 p 48f, p 60ff 
10
 See Cramér, EU och Europatanken – Ett rättsligt och historiskt perspektiv, for an outline of the historical and 
ideological background to the formation of EU as the legal entity we know today.  
  
5 
Organization (NATO) and within other fields through the Council of Europe. It was crucial to 
restabilize the relations between France and Germany after the war in order to secure the 
European peace. Furthermore, the post-WWII bipolar political climate made integration 
among Western European states, notably Western Germany, strategically important as a 
counter weight to the communist Soviet Union and its expansion into Eastern Europe. This 
was the rationale behind the setting up of the supranational European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), binding the old enemies to peacefully cooperate within the limited field 
of coal and steel production.11 After the failed effort to create an ambitious European political 
community in 1953,12 the Euratom and European Economic Community (EEC) treaties were 
signed in 1957, marking the beginning of the EC.  
 
The European integration is a unique and ongoing project that continuingly deepens and 
widens. This is reflected in the preamble of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(TEC) and reaffirmed in the Treaty on European Union (TEU): “Determined to lay the 
foundations of an even closer union among the peoples of Europe”.13 Geographical 
enlargement is a prominent feature of the integration with 27 member states to this date and 
negotiations taking place with even more. Times of stagnation in the member states 
cooperation have been counter weighted by the activism of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), developing the unique features of supremacy and direct effect of European law.14 The 
economic integration has been predominant during several decades, despite the political and 
strategic incentives for integration, with the establishment of a common market with free 
movement of goods, services, capital and workers and a monetary union with common 
currency in several member states. The political cooperation between the member states 
gained momentum in the 70’s, but a political union did not become a reality until the 
Maastricht Treaty on the European Union from 1992,15 which introduced the three-pillar 
structure with an economic supranational pillar supplemented by the intergovernmental 
common foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
                                                 
11
 Cramér 1994 p 44ff, p 54f, 63ff, Craig and De Búrca p 8f. The ECSC treaty was signed in 1951 by France, 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.  
12
 France was weary over German remilitarization and submitted the draft treaty to its national assembly, where 
it was rejected. Craig and De Búrca p 10  
13
 This is in conjunction with neofunctionalist theory of integration, according to which integration starts in less 
controversial areas, i.e. economic, and thereafter can spill over into more sensitive areas when it is politically 
possible. Compare Craig and De Búrca p 5. The preamble statement is interesting in an additional sense, as it 
says something about the perception of Europe as constituted of distinct people.  
14
 Cramér 1994 p 202 
15
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html 
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An important factor behind this step towards deeper integration was the changing geopolitical 
climate after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the need to integrate a united Germany into 
Western Europe.16 Thereafter, intergovernmental conferences have entailed important treaty 
revisions in Amsterdam 199717 and Nice 2000,18 preparing the Union for the Eastern 
enlargement. Except for institutional reform, some of the more important innovations have 
been that provisions on the free movement of persons, covering visa, asylum, immigration 
and judicial cooperation in civil matters are now part of the first pillar instead of the third and 
that the Schengen Treaty and the related legal body on the gradual abolition on common 
border checks has been incorporated into the EC/EU framework.  
 
The development of the EU is naturally not an easy or clear-cut process. Periods of rapid 
integration are followed by backlash and increased emphasis on national interests. It is always 
possible to argue that the integration process is going too far since the end-goal of the Union 
is not clearly defined. The rather heated and sometimes confused debate over the European 
Constitutional Treaty19 and the subsequent rejection of the same in Dutch and French 
referendums reflect this discourse. At the time of this essay, a reform treaty – the Treaty of 
Lisbon (ToL)20 - has been agreed upon and awaits national ratifications. It contains several of 
the innovations of the Constitution, some of the more important being institutional reforms 
with regard to the increased number of member states and the paradox of increased powers to 
both the European and the national parliaments in an attempt to decrease the “democratic 
deficit” of the Union.21 The common foreign and security policy is strengthened.22 
Furthermore, there is increased focus on and clearer definitions of the values upon which the 
Union is founded. The European Human Rights Charter is given the status of EU primary law 
and the treaty also stipulates that EU shall accede to the European Convention on the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (The European Convention).23 It is 
evident that European policy-makers today consider that EU should be a union based on 
values and that these are important in a further integration process.  
                                                 
16
 Cramér 1994 p 148ff 
17
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html  
18
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/htm/12001C.html  
19
 Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML  
20
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML  
21
 See the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union and the Protocol on the application 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and Title II art 8-8C in the reform treaty.  
22
 See title V ”General provisions on the Union’s external actions and specific provisions on a common foreign 
and security policy” (former ”Provisions on a common foreign and security policy”)  
23
 See the reformed art 6 TEU and the new art 1a  
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1.1.3 ASEAN cooperation and integration 
ASEAN was founded in Bangkok in 1967 by five Southeast Asian states: Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The Bangkok declaration was by no means 
an equivalent to the treaty of Rome, but rather a simplistic document encompassing a bare 
minimum set of rules to establish ASEAN and state its aim and purpose.24 The explicit 
purposes were to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development and 
to promote peace and stability in the region. However, it seems to be widely acknowledged 
that even though heavy emphasis was put on economic cooperation, the rationale behind 
ASEAN was political.25 Rival territorial claims in the South China Sea, the Indonesian policy 
of konfrontasi and the Philippine’s claims to Borneo, were all disputes threatening to 
deteriorate into armed conflict. The need to overcome the mutual suspicions and hostility 
between the member states after their independence from colonial powers and instead 
cooperate peacefully and solve existing disputes was thus the prime motive behind the 
initiative.26 Also, the member states of ASEAN were able to form a common front against 
communist insurgency.27 The Bangkok declaration needs to be seen against this background 
and furthermore as a potential instrument for the ASEAN countries to safeguard their interests 
against those of the leading world powers.28  
 
Starting as a forum for confidence building and regional stabilization, ASEAN has over the 
years expanded both geographically, with the accession of first Brunei, and later Vietnam, 
Laos, Burma/Myanmar (hereafter Myanmar) and Cambodia (CLMV countries), and 
functionally, with the broadening of the scope of cooperation.29 In 2003, a decision was made 
to establish an ASEAN Community, encompassing three pillars of cooperation, namely 
political and security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation.30 In the realm of the today 
most advanced field - the economic - an ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA) was signed in 
                                                 
24
 ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), 8 August 1967, www.aseansec.org/11824.htm  
25
 According to former S-G Mr Severino, the economic goals were used in the Bangkok declaration so that the 
association wouldn’t be taken for a military pact. Seminar 24 Jan 2008 - ”Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN 
Community” 
26
 Severino 2006 p 161f, Lindberg 2007 p 4, 120f 
27
 Lindberg p 4 Whereas communist insurgency might have been a common concern to at least some of the 
member states, Mr Severino argues that China never was perceived as a common external threat by the ASEAN 
countries. Seminar - ”Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN Community”. This is a difference compared to the 
European integration process, which is largely shaped by the perceived threat of the Soviet Union.  
28
 Kraft p 2, Severino 2006 p 3 
29
 Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 
1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. 
30
 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), www.aseansec.org/15160.htm  
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1992, with the elimination of most tariffs between the member states as a result.31 There is 
also an ASEAN framework agreement on trade in services (AFAS) and an ASEAN 
investment area (IAI). According to plans, an ASEAN economic community, with a free flow 
of goods, services, investments and a freer flow of capital, will be launched in 2015.32 A 
future political and security community will encompass open cooperation in trans-national 
problems, rather than a joint foreign policy or military alliance.33 The hesitation of the 
member states in this area (and to some extent also within the economic realm) can be 
explained by their relatively recently acquired independence, mutual suspicions and the 
consequently great importance given the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
one another. Even so, it is argued that it is with regard to these issues, in preventing and 
handling conflicts between the member states and overcoming the mutual suspicions that the 
main achievements of the organization lie.34 At the same time, economic integration has taken 
an increasingly important role in the ASEAN integration process in the last few years, 
perhaps implying a shift of focus in ASEAN from politics to economics.35 
 
One of the more striking features of ASEAN regionalism is its openness and the cooperation 
between the region and external partners. ASEAN has eleven dialogue partners, including the 
EU, the US, Russia and all the major players in the region. Within the constellation 
ASEAN+3, dialogue between the region and China, Japan and South Korea takes place and 
the East Asia Summit (EAS) additionally encompasses India, Australia and New Zeeland. 
Thus, ASEAN successfully gathers all the Asian giants, trying to position itself as the hub and 
driver of regional integration.36 The different forums are sometimes dismissed as mere “talk 
shops”. This is to some extent true, but they still offer an important platform for discussion 
and consensus building in the region.  
 
Most scholars seem to agree that the so called ASEAN way, with consensus as prerequisite 
for decisions and flexible diplomacy instead of formalized institutions and mechanisms has 
                                                 
31
 Import duties for the six older members should be fully eliminated by 2010, and for the CLMV countries the 
time frame is 2015 (with certain concessions for sensitive products until 2018). (Protocol to Amend the 
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) for the Elimination of Import Duties, www.aseansec.org/14184.htm).  
32
 Bali Concord II, paragraph B.3. The original timeframe was 2020, but the process was speeded up, partly due 
to Singaporean and Thai initiatives.   
33
 Compare Bali Concord II, paragraph A.2, where the principle of “comprehensive security” is outlined. 
34
 Severino 2006 p 164, 208, Kin Wah, ASEAN: Facing the Fifth Decade, 2007, p 2 
35
 Severino 2006 p 252 
36
 “Know you ASEAN” p 43, ASEAN Vision 2020 and the ASEAN Charter art 41 
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served the region well and that ASEAN (at least at certain times) has been a stabilizing factor 
in the region.37 However, these characteristics, letting the country least inclined to integrate 
setting the pace, have also made progress slow. There are still vast differences between the 
rich and the poor member states. Non-compliance with agreements is a problem and a lot of 
obstacles still remain in the field of economic integration.38 The changing geo-political and 
economic climate, with tougher regional competition, first and foremost through the rise of 
China, together with trans-national challenges, such as pandemics, terrorism and 
environmental hazards, has prompted ASEAN to step up its interaction.39 To meet the new 
challenges and keep its relevance, the 40 years old association decided to go legal. The 
ASEAN Charter was signed during the 13th ASEAN summit in Singapore in November 2007. 
The Charter was by many considered to be a disappointment with its lack of explicit 
mechanisms for sanctions in case of non-compliance or grave breaches against the Charter 
provisions. Nevertheless, it gave the association a legal standing and reaffirmed, and to some 
extent also redefined the fundamental purposes and principles of the organization, for the first 
time encompassing principles regarding states’ behaviour towards their own citizens. ASEAN 
is at a crossroads after 40 years of cooperation, facing increased pressure both internally and 
externally to step up its interaction and promote human rights and other important issues. As 
with the EU, the question of common fundamental values and regional identity is going to be 
vital for the future course of integration in ASEAN. 
1.2 Aim of study 
Through a comparative analysis, this thesis seeks to explore the different mechanisms and 
institutions for handling breaches against fundamental principles within the two regional 
organizations ASEAN and EU. Inter-linked with the issue of the legal-institutional framework 
is that of what values the mechanisms are designed to protect. Thus, this thesis also aims at 
assessing the regional integration in EU and ASEAN with regard to common fundamental 
values.  
 
To this end, the following questions are asked: 
 
- Which mechanisms are in place within the EU in order to protect and sanction 
common fundamental values? 
                                                 
37
 See e.g. Severino 2006 p 35, Kin Wah p 2f and the outline in Lindberg 2006 p 101f 
38
 Severino 2006 p 246ff 
39
 See e.g. Framing the ASEAN Charter – An ISEAS perspective, Compiled by Rodolfo C. Severino, 2005 p 6f 
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o What is the background to the design of the current system? 
o What is the actual scope of application? 
o What values do they seek to protect? 
- Which mechanisms are in place within ASEAN in order to protect and sanction 
common fundamental values?  
o What is the background to the design of the current system and to what, if any, 
extent has it been inspired by the EU? 
o What is the scope of application compared to that in the EU? 
o What values do they seek to protect? 
o How are those values similar or different to the common fundamental values of 
the European Union? 
1.3 Method, scope and disposition 
As mentioned this thesis aims at a comparative analysis of EU and ASEAN. A comparison 
between two systems with such great differences in history, culture, religion, economic 
development and domestic policies and concerns is naturally somewhat weary. Each system 
follows its own logic and concepts that seem alike can only be truly understood in its own 
context. Therefore, and as far as possible, the phenomena under scrutiny will be put within its 
regional context. However, these attempts to give a broader perspective will naturally be 
somewhat sketchy. The aim of the thesis is to explore the situations within ASEAN and EU. 
Thus, more detailed questions of promotion of regional values in the external relations, which 
plays an important role in EU foreign policy, are beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
some aspects of the external relations will be discussed in the concluding remarks since it is in 
the interaction between the EU and ASEAN that differences regarding common values can 
become problematic. 
 
The method used for the analysis is first and foremost that of public international and 
European law. Consequently, conventions, declarations and other instruments of international 
law are used when applicable. These are supplemented by official publications, press material 
and doctrine. The research is not limited to legal literature, which is almost impossible to find 
regarding ASEAN. Furthermore, the field of study, i.e. values, is not an area much researched 
in the legal literature. Hence, literature within political science, international relations, 
economics, etc. is also used in order to give more substance to the issues presented. 
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The thesis starts with two sections on EU and ASEAN respectively, followed by the 
comparative analysis and concluding remarks. However, in order to avoid unnecessary 
repeating, there are several comparing elements also in the ASEAN section. Both the EU and 
the ASEAN section starts by exploring the mechanisms for protection of fundamental values. 
Whereas the EU mechanism has a legal basis in an article in the TEU, the ASEAN way of 
dealing with serious breaches is more pragmatic and a broader approach is necessary. 
Thereafter, the sections attempt to answer the question of what might constitute common 
regional values and what role they play in the integration process. For a deeper understanding 
of the EU and ASEAN perception and handling of fundamental values, two concrete cases are 
outlined, namely the “Haider affaire” in Europe and the ASEAN policy towards the repressive 
regime in Myanmar.  
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2 EU 
2.1 A mechanism for constitutional discipline 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) introduced the “sanction clause” into European law through 
what today is art 7 TEU.40 The constituting principles of the Union were for the first time 
made explicit and linked to sanctions, thus subjecting the member states to an entirely new 
kind of constitutional discipline. 41 Certainly, the ECJ had scrutinized the Union’s institutions 
and the member states actions with regard to human rights for quite some time. However, this 
type of control is limited to situations where the community law is applicable.42 Art 7 TEU 
makes it possible to politically sanction member states gross violations of common 
fundamental principles, regardless of the applicability of community competence or 
regulation.  
2.1.1 Background – Fear of the others 
 
Art 7 TEU can only be assessed with regard to the overriding ambitions of ToA - to prepare 
the Union for Eastern enlargement. It was evident that the political and economic changes of 
the enlargement would be substantial and there was a fear that the stability of the Union could 
be undermined.43 Several of the aspiring member states were new democracies with 
complicated minority issues within their borders and the clause was thus a precautionary 
measure.44 There were naturally the membership criteria that needed to be fulfilled before the 
accession45 but the sanction clause would ensure that a state would not fall back into 
undemocratic practices after the accession (or rather that such a lapse wouldn’t have to be 
tolerated by the fellow member states). The implication is interesting – membership in the EU 
was no longer seen as a guarantee for certain values such as democracy and the protection of 
human rights.  
 
                                                 
40
 Former art F.1 ToA. There was such a clause with regard to the principle of democracy in the draft treaty on 
the European Union from 1984. The draft was, however, rejected.  
41
 Compare Cramér and Wrange p 50 It is noteworthy that this type of control often is found in federal systems, 
e.g. in the USA and Germany, where the principle of democracy is sanctioned in the constitution, making it 
possible for the federal government to intervene, should the states fail to comply. Verhoeven s. 221, 224 not 28  
42
 Verhoeven p 225 
43
 Neuwahl and Wheatley p 232 
44
 Duvigneau p 75, Berzelius p 373 
45
 The Copenhagen criteria. Art 49 TEU was introduced together with art 7 TEU, explicitly linking membership 
to the values in art 6 TEU.  
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Before the ToA, the existence of certain common principles or values within the Union had 
more or less been taken for granted.46 Promotion of democracy, good governance and human 
rights had been part of the Union’s external policies for some time and had become 
increasingly important as treaty based commitments since the 1990’s,47 but it was only after 
the fall of the Berlin wall and the realistic prospect of Eastern enlargement, together with the 
strengthening of undemocratic groupings in some member states, that the member states felt 
compelled to codify and sanctions the values internally.48 The new strains on the Union 
challenged an important and underlying assumption for the European integration - that of 
mutual constitutional trust.49 Such trust is fundamental in the European system where 
European law is recognized as the supreme law of the land. In order for the member states to 
accept this order and give supremacy to EU law over their own constitutions, all other 
member states have to abide by the fundamental principles of democracy, liberty and 
protection of human rights.50 The legitimacy of the EU is to a great extent derived from its 
member states and their respect for certain fundamental principles is therefore essential.51  
2.1.2 Design and limitations 
 
Art 7 TEU had the following design: 
1. The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government and acting by unanimity 
on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the assent of 
the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member 
State of principles mentioned in Article F(1), after inviting the government of the Member State in 
question to submit its observations. 
 
2. Where such a determination has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to 
suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, 
including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. 
In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the 
                                                 
46
 Compare the Treaty of Maastricht art F (today art 6.1) – stating that ”The Union shall respect the national 
identities of its member states, whose system of government are founded on the principles of democracy”.  
47
 Balfour, p 115, Neuwahl and Wheatley p 230, COM (2003)606 – The Commissions message to the council 
regarding art 7 TEU p 4  
48
 Verhoeven p 218 f For example, in 1994, Berlusconi formed government with the Italian fascist party. The 
European Parliament issued a warning and expressed their expectations that Italy would continue to respect the 
values of the Union.  
49
 The term is used by Cramér and Wrange p 59, referring to Weiler p 14f and his notion of”constitutional 
tolerance”.  
50
 Cramér and Wrange p 59 
51
  Compare Verhoeven p 221 It is e.g. important for the democratic legitimacy of the Union that the member 
states that transfer powers to the Union are democratic since the decision making within EU to a great extent lies 
with non-elected institutions.  
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rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. 
 
The obligations of the Member State in question under this Treaty shall in any case continue to be binding 
on that State. 
 
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke measures taken 
under paragraph 2 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed. 
 
4. For the purposes of this Article, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the 
representative of the government of the Member State in question. Abstentions by members present in 
person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of decisions referred to in paragraph 1. A qualified 
majority shall be defined as the same proportion of the weighted votes of the members of the Council 
concerned as laid down in Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
 
This paragraph shall also apply in the event of voting rights being suspended pursuant to paragraph 2. 
 
5. For the purposes of this Article, the European Parliament shall act by a two thirds majority of the votes 
cast, representing a majority of its members.’ 
 
The principles over which the council is given the possibility of control are those in art 6.1 
TEU,52 i.e. the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law.53 There is also an equivalent provision on the suspension of 
privileges under TEC.54  
 
To this day, art 7 TEU has not been used. This is not surprising given that it was underlined 
during the negotiations that the provision only was to be used in extreme circumstances, such 
as the total collapse of a democratic regime.55 There was no definition given of what would be 
considered as a serious and persistent violation of human rights.56 The clause was at the time 
primarily regarded as a symbolic tool to safeguard the common principles of the Union, 
having deterring effect as its primary goal.57 The high voting threshold would safeguard its 
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exceptional use, since unanimity would require extreme circumstances.58 However, what is 
considered to be exceptional circumstances can change over time. This is demonstrated by the 
Haider affaire and the subsequent treaty revision in Nice. The affaire also put a finger on the 
weakness of the repressive rather than preventive nature of the clause. 
 2.1.3 The Haider affaire59 and the Treaty of Nice 
 
The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), led by Jörg Haider and usually characterised a rightist 
and xenophobic popular party, captured 27 % of the votes in the 1999 Austrian parliamentary 
election. In order to form a government, the conservatives were negotiating with the FPÖ. 
This was not accepted by the other 14 member states of the EU (the 14), which agreed to act 
coordinated, but bilaterally outside the Union’s institutions, in order to prevent the course of 
events. The 14 declared that they neither would accept bilateral official contacts with an 
Austrian government integrating FPÖ nor support Austrian candidates seeking positions in 
international organizations and that Austrian ambassadors would only be received on a 
technical level. When a coalition government was formed with the FPÖ despite this 
declaration, the 14 stated that they would never accept such a government.60 It is generally 
assumed that the action by the 14 did not constitute an infringement of neither public 
international law nor EU law, even if the advisability of the action has been questioned.61 The 
14 justified their actions by referring to the necessity of protecting the Union’s fundamental 
values. Nonetheless, the actions were taken without even rhetorically referring to art 7 TEU.62 
The sanction clause was not directly applicable to the situation since the 14 acted preventively 
against an anticipated (and not an existing) breach of the common values.63  
 
Austria was naturally opposed to the 14’s measures, arguing that they had no intention to 
violate human rights. Furthermore, they presented an idea for how the Union’s fundamental 
values could be strengthened in handling similar situations in the future. The suggested 
solution, which was subsequently repeated by the “three wise men” in their report on the 
situation in Austria (initiated by the 14), was the incorporation of a preventive monitoring 
                                                 
58
 Langrish p 15 
59
 See Cramér and Wrange The Haider affair, law and European integration for an assessment of the affaire 
with regard to both public international law and EU law.  
60
 Cramér and Wrange p 28f 
61
 See Cramér and Wrange for this analysis. Compare Neuwahl and Wheatley p 234 and Nergélius, p 372f   
62
 Nergélius p 373, Cramér and Wrange p 45 and 51 
63
 Cramér and Wrange p 44  
  
16 
clause in the TEU.64 The suggested prevention mechanism would help to evaluate the member 
states commitment and performance with respect to common European values.65 
 
The Treaty of Nice consequently introduced an important first paragraph in art 7 TEU 
containing the preventive function of the provision: 
 
On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the 
Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four-fifths of its members after obtaining the assent of 
the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State 
of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and address appropriate recommendations to that State. Before 
making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and, acting in 
accordance with the same procedure, may call on independent persons to submit within a reasonable time 
limit a report on the situation in the Member State in question. 
After the treaty revision, a clear risk that a member state will violate the principles in art 6 
TEU allows the council to take a decision. It is sufficient with a majority of four fifths to take 
such a decision. Sanctions are, however, not permitted under this paragraph. Another novelty 
is the right of initiative given to the European Parliament. The prevention and sanction clause 
co-exist and can be applied independently of one another. The strong political nature of the 
clause was somewhat lessened by the introduction of judicial control by the ECJ regarding the 
rules of procedure in art 7 TEU.66 However, this “right to defence” does not encompass the 
substantial criteria, leaving the clause essentially political in its nature.67  
2.1.4 Applicability and function 
 
The scope of application of art 7 is severely limited also after the Treaty of Nice. Firstly, the 
conditions set forth in the paragraph serve as limitations. It is systematic violations and not 
isolated instances of infringements that are targeted by the provision.68 The fact that the 
violation has to be serious and persistent sets the threshold for application, leaving the less 
serious infringements to be dealt with by national courts, the European Court for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (The European Court) or the ECJ with 
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regard to community law. When assessing if the criteria of the article are met, regard is given 
to the content, object (if it regards a particularly vulnerable group) and consequences of the 
measure under scrutiny. Repeated convictions in international courts for the same type of 
violations are indications of that the action is persistent. 69 An example of what is considered 
to be a clear risk is the instituting of a law allowing certain derogations from the rule of law 
in times of war.70 The Haider affaire gives an indication of in what type of situations the 
preventive mechanism can be applied since it was designed to handle similar situations.71 The 
application of art 7 TEU is thus not longer that theoretical, given the rise of rightist populist 
parties in Europe. It is noteworthy that it was the identity, rather than the actions, of FPÖ that 
caused the reactions.72 They had not said anything objectionable in their declaration when 
forming government and it is unlikely that their policy on immigration would differ much 
from other European countries under the pressure of unemployment and xenophobic 
tendencies. Hence, the identity or the implicit xenophobic wishes of FPÖ was the crucial 
factor for the 14, setting a possible precedent for similar cases in the future. 
 
There is also the issue of what sanctions, besides suspension of the voting rights in the 
Council that can be used if unanimity on the violation has been reached. These seem to be 
somewhat limited since due regard has to be given to the consequences for physical and legal 
persons. It is the state that should be targeted which makes it dubious if it is possible to 
suspend the citizens of the Union’s rights.73 It should at least be impossible to suspend the 
most fundamental rights of the EU citizens, such as the free movement of persons.74 A 
possible line of argumentation is that any sanction under art 7 TEU should be institutional, 
rather that substantial. Examples of sanctions of this type are increased financial levies, 
suspension of presidency and the right to appoint commissioners.75 The possibility of 
suspension of membership or expulsion was discussed but discarded during the Amsterdam 
negotiations.76  
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Furthermore, the actual importance of art 7 TEU depends on the institutions that have the task 
of applying it. Both the Commission and the European Parliament have a responsibility to 
prevent violations of the Union’s values. The Commission gives momentum to their 
preventive role, emphasising the need for control of the member states’ respect for the 
common values through e.g. increased dialogue between the institutions, with the 
Commissariat for Human Rights at the Council of Europe and with the European civil 
society.77 The repressive role of art 7 TEU is seen as superfluous and counter productive in a 
Union of values.78 On the contrary, the European Parliament sees the negligence to apply 
sanctions under the provision as unwillingness to use all means necessary to protect the 
Union’s fundamental values.79 Ultimately, in order to actually apply art 7 TEU, the Council 
needs to be able to take a decision, or to put it differently, there has to be a political 
willingness for the member states to act on an alleged violation of fundamental values. The 
rule itself cannot substitute a political will to act.80  
 
The Haider affaire certainly indicates that such willingness exists and that there is some 
consensus with regard to common values. However, political and diplomatic concerns should 
keep the threshold for using the mechanisms in art 7 TEU continuingly high. The article 
contains a possibility to act, not a duty, and a diplomatic solution outside the Union’s 
framework is always an option – especially since action under art 7 TEU is not necessarily the 
best way to safeguard the principles set forth in article 6.1 TEU. 81 This flexible, political 
character is underlined by the ECJ’s lack of control.82 To what extent there is political will to 
act under art 7 TEU is naturally depending on the political costs of such action. The measures 
against Austria were met with loud protests, notably by some of the former candidate states.83 
                                                 
77
 COM (2003)606 pp 9-11 There are already several sources of information to exercise such control, e.g. the 
case law of the European Court for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, reports of 
international organizations and NGO’s and complaints by individuals to the Commission and ECJ. On the 
initiative of the European Parliament, a network of independent experts on human rights exists since 2002. The 
Commission would like to strengthen their role and coordinate it with the European Centre for the monitoring of 
racism and xenophobia.    
78
 COM (2003)606 p 3f 
79
 Resolution by the European Parliament on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on article 7 TEU: Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based. 
M(2004)0309 paragraphs 4, 6-10  
80
 Cramér and Wrange p 59f 
81
 Action like that taken by the 14 should be more or less pre-empted in the future after the Nice treaty revision. 
However, the member states still have the right to act in accordance with public international law if decision-
making in the Council is blocked. Cramér and Wrange p 53, 59, Neuwahl and Wheatley p 234f 
82
 The Commission suggested repeatedly during the Amsterdam and Nice negotiations that the substantial 
conditions in art 7 TEU should be subjected to judicial control by the ECJ. The idea was however rejected. COM 
(2003)606 p 6 
83
 Cramér and Wrange p 31 
  
19 
It is doubtful that the member states would act in a similar manner if the stakes were higher, 
i.e. if one of the more influential member states was risking violation of the fundamental 
values.84 This is problematic since the legitimacy of a measure under art 7 TEU to a great 
extent depends on whether it is applied consistently.85 Furthermore, a future schism between 
the old and new member states is possible, given the low level of support among the new 
member states for the 14’s measures.  
 
In summing up, the sanction clause was a response to a perceived threat against the Union’s 
common values, to be used in extreme circumstances like coup d’états. This limited function 
of the clause was challenged by the Haider affaire, through which the member states 
expressed a need to act preventively against democratically elected governments with a 
doubtful agenda. As a consequence hereof, the provision that primarily had been a symbol for 
European values, became a platform for the Union’s institutions preventive work to monitor 
and control the member states adherence to the Union’s fundamental principles. An actual 
decision under art 7 TEU is, however, still very unlikely and is depending on political will 
and the balance of powers in the Union.  
2.2 A community of values? 
 
The introduction of art 6 and 7 TEU and the subsequent Haider affaire suggests the 
emergence of a European community of values.86 Some of the questions raised by this 
development will be assessed in this section. Special regard is given to the relation between 
European and universal values and regional identity.   
2.2.1 European values  
 
Values and principles are two notions that, to some extent, have been used interchangeably in 
this text. As indicated in the introduction there is however a significant difference between the 
two: principles being legal rules and values being a notion of absolute positive significance. 
                                                 
84
 As an indication of this, Germany was criticized by the European Commission against xenophobia and 
intolerance in 2001 for the lack of effectiveness in their legislation and action in preventing these problems. 
Germany responded that they respected the rule of law and further threatened to suspend their financial 
contributions to the Council of Europe. This did not prompt any reaction among the EU member states. Neuwahl 
and Wheatley p 236 This could be explained by the fact that it was the consequences of certain policies that were 
the issue, rather than the identity of the regime. Compare above 2.1.4, p 17   
85
 Compare Neuwahl and Wheatley p 235 See also paragraph 11 c in the Resolution by the European Parliament 
M(2004)0309, stating that the principle of equal treatment of member states regardless of size, political influence 
etc., should be applied when taking measures under art 7 TEU.  
86
 See Cramér and Wrange p 55 note 88, citing the discourse supporting the measures taken by the 14 against 
Austria.  
  
20 
Today, art 6.1 TEU enumerates principles, although they likely reflect corresponding values. 
However, the draft Constitutional Treaty and the ToL enumerate values. In the latter, the 
former art 6.1 is now rewritten and constitutes art 1a, stating that: 
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. 
 
The change in classification from “principles” to values” signifies that European policy 
makers are pushing for a European community founded on values. It is noteworthy that 
minority protection has been part of the criteria for enlargement for quite some time, whereas 
there has not been an equivalent internal imperative until now.87 The affirmation of minority 
rights in the article is thus an attempt to create symmetry in internal and external relations, 
hence strengthening the Union’s legitimacy.  
 
The redefinition through ToL of the Union’s aims in art 2 TEU further outlines what values 
are encompassed by the EU: 
1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in 
which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime. 
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social 
exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women 
and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich 
cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
enhanced. 
4. The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro. 
5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of 
poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
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observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter. 
 
Using the provisions on common values and the Union’s aims as a starting point, Manners 
identifies nine values, distinguished from other Western values that can be considered as 
constituting EU. These are sustainable peace, social liberty, consensual democracy, 
associative human rights, supra-national rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, 
sustainable development and good governance.88 Some of these are more developed than 
others, e.g. human rights, where a legal body has been developed through The European 
Convention and the case law by the European Court. Others are vaguer, such as sustainable 
development. Some are contested, where especially social solidarity can be challenged on the 
grounds that the principle of free market economy often trumps social concerns within the 
Union, considering the paramount importance given to the establishment of an internal market 
through the four freedoms. However, it is important to separate end-goal and means. The 
EU’s primary economic goal is to improve the welfare of all EU citizens and the chosen mean 
to reach this goal is a market economy based on competitiveness and market openness. Also, 
the internal liberalisation of the European market has been supplemented be increased 
regulation at the regional level and there is the possibility for the member states to impose 
their own regulation restricting the free movements on e.g. environmental or social grounds 
when this can be justified as a mandatory requirement. A supplementing or competing value 
to Manner’s could thus be regulated liberalism or capitalism.89  
 
The tendency in the EU constitutional development, as reflected in the ToL is clear; the 
policy-makers of the Union consider common values to be an important feature of European 
integration and furthermore suggest that what we have today is a community of values. 
However, it is also possible, as argued by Klabbers, that the EU is heading in the other 
direction and that making the EU membership subject to conditionality signifies that the 
Community does not consider itself as a community anymore.90 Klabbers points out the fact 
that the conditionality of art 7 TEU was not introduced at the time of the Community’s 
founding, despite of the recent dictatorships in Germany and Italy. Furthermore, neither the 
accession of Greece nor Spain and Portugal - countries marked by military rule and coup 
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d’états – prompted this response.91 It was only in the 1990’s with the Eastern enlargement that 
the need to codify and sanction common principles occurred. The reason for this was, 
according to Klabbers, that the European project by this time had abandoned its original 
philosophy of solidarity, instrumental to keep peace, and reiterated to “a new form of 
superficial intergovernmentalism”.92 For sure, the very existence of art 6 and 7 TEU indicates 
that the mutual constitutional trust is not what it has been. Rules usually exist because people 
tend to act contrary to them. An example is the inclusion of minority protection in art 6 TEU, 
a field in which it is obvious that several member states do not meet the standard. This does 
not necessarily entail the conclusion that the EU has given up its aspirations to be a true 
community (of values), but can on the contrary mean that the integration process has 
deepened and widened into such sensitive areas that the need to trust the fellow member states 
in certain regards has become even more crucial. The Maastricht treaty turned the EC into a 
political creature, formalizing the past years development. It is hardly surprising that this 
development is reflected by a greater anxiety in the subsequent enlargement to countries that 
recently emerged communism. The introduction of art 6 and 7 TEU merely shows that there is 
a perceived gap between what is and what should be and hopefully the provisions can help 
overcoming this gap.  
2.2.2 Universal values and regional identity 
 
There is an inherent tension between universal values and regional identity. It is unclear what 
the often-cited expression “European values” really signifies in this regard. Through assessing 
the enlargement processes and external policies of the EU, a lot of things can be said about 
the internal state of affairs. Sjursen and others question the EU enlargement process in order 
to describe the European order.93 Three ideal types are outlined: namely EU reduced to a 
rational problem solving entity, EU moving towards a value-based community, and EU 
moving towards a rights-based post-national union.94 EU has with the exception of the British 
candidacy in the 60’s systematically decided in favour of enlargement and findings suggest 
that EU being a rational problem solving entity seeking economic and strategic gain cannot 
alone explain the enlargement process. Instead, the value-based community founded on a 
conception of a common European identity and the rights based post-national union resting on 
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universal rights and democratic procedures are two models that can explain the European 
enlargement process.95 It is notably democracy promotion that has provided the basic 
rationale for all enlargements starting with Greece in 1981, except for the EFTA in 1995.96  
 
However, cultural identity also seems to be a part of EU enlargement policy and the 
membership negotiations with Turkey put a finger on the difference between the two different 
types of value-based community. A sense of kinship and duty to enlarge has played an 
important role in the rhetoric supporting the Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007.97 With 
regard to Turkey, emphasis has been on Turkey as an important partner to EU, rather than on 
kinship.98 Some of those opposing Turkey’s membership use the arguments that Turkey is not 
a natural part of Europe – neither geographically, nor culturally and religiously.99 This 
rhetoric reflects an image of a shared European identity and inherited values, rather than EU 
founded on universal values, regardless of cultural background or religious adherence. In 
comparing the EU membership negotiations of Romania and Turkey, Lundgren shows that 
concern for democracy and human rights alone cannot explain their different treatment.100 
However, there has been a development in the EU’s attitude and policy towards Turkey from 
the late 90’s and if this process continues, it might indicate that the EU is moving towards a 
union based on universal rights. 
 
This duality in the European image of itself as a value-based entity is to some extent reflected 
in a new passage in the preamble of the TEU, introduced through ToL, where the EU 
emphasizes universal values as a part of its regional identity:  
 
DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which 
have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law 
 
It should be noted that it was much debated during the 2002-03 Convention and the 2003-04 
IGC whether there should be any reference to god, Christian values or the Greco-Latin 
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heritage in this paragraph of the preamble.101 Seven governments presented this idea at the 
IGC. There were, however, several governments that strongly objected to any such inclusion. 
The reference to the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe is a compromise 
over which consensus could be reached.102 The EU motto “Unity in diversity” reflects the fact 
that the member states are heterogeneous in many respects. This is even more so after the 
latest enlargements. The difficulties of finding a common denominator for all member states 
that goes further than common adherence to universal values is thus not surprising and it is 
doubtful whether it would be fruitful.  
 
A final point should be made on the distinction between European and universal values. The 
EU claims that its constituting values (the European values), such as democracy and human 
rights are universal. This can be contested and has especially been so by Asian debaters and 
policymakers, as will be discussed in section 3.2.1 below. As reflected in the new passage in 
the TEU preamble, the universal values have developed from the European inheritance. 
Through its external policies, the EU has given itself the task to promote human rights and 
democracy in all parts of the world. This perspective on universal values, that the EU has a 
special role and responsibility as their promoter and protector, might be what is specifically 
European about them.    
 
 
                                                 
101
 The Convention was decided upon by the Council in Laeken in 2001 and was an institutional innovation, 
charged with preparing the IGC in an open and transparent manner. It was meant to pave the way for the 
Constitution that was adopted at the 2004 IGC.  
102
 See the fact sheet by the Commission on the outcome of the European Convention, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/european_convention/index_en.htm and 2004 IGC, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/cig2004/debates2_en.htm#PREAMBLE  
  
25 
3 ASEAN 
3.1 The ASEAN way 
When reading about Southeast Asian integration, the “ASEAN way” is an often-cited 
expression. The concept itself implies that there is another way - namely the European. The 
ASEAN way encompasses emphasis on state sovereignty, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states, preference for consensus-style decision-making and informal 
agreements over treaties and legalistic rules and reliance on national institutions and actions, 
rather than a strong central bureaucracy.103  
3.1.1 Informality and soft diplomacy 
Specific ASEAN traits, such as consensus as the principle of decision-making and the lack of 
strong institutions and legal binding arrangements are different aspects of the preference for 
informality.104 The characteristic is still a prominent feature of the association, albeit limited 
by the signing of the ASEAN Charter. The informal character of ASEAN is evident from the 
way it was founded. The Bangkok declaration lacked the usual legal provisions on 
amendments, voting, etc. and did not set up any compliance-monitoring system or dispute 
settlement body. According to former Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino, “the declaration 
was essentially an expression of their determination not to allow their disputes to develop into 
conflict and their resolve to work together for common purposes, purposes that at the time 
were only vaguely discerned and projected”.105 However, after the Bangkok-declaration, 
several formal treaties have been agreed upon. First was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia (TAC) from 1976, stipulating binding norms of inter-state behaviour. These 
are inter alia: national sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs, rejection of the use 
or threat of use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes.106  
 
ASEAN leaders have to a great extent relied on diplomacy and personal relations instead of 
strong institutions.107 Institutions are reactive rather than proactive compared to the EU. 
Severino calls it that institutions follow substance, i.e. that institutions in ASEAN are created 
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in order to support measures previously agreed upon, rather than the other way around.108 The 
central institution in ASEAN that would be comparable to the EC Commission is the ASEAN 
Secretariat, created in 1976 and based in Jakarta. However, there are virtually no similarities 
between the two institutions. While the EC Commission has a far-reaching mandate with 
great executive, enforcement and legislative initiative powers, the ASEAN Secretariat is very 
limited in size and scope. The mandate allows the Secretary-General to initiate, advise, 
coordinate and implement ASEAN activities.109 However, in reality the mandate is so 
circumscribed that the Secretary-General cannot initiate and authoritatively call for 
compliance with ASEAN agreements or take other actions to fulfil ASEAN’s purposes.110 
There is a dispute settlement mechanism regarding economic agreements similar to the quasi-
judicial panel system set up under the WTO.111  
3.1.2 Non-intervention  
3.1.2.1 Content 
The principle of non-intervention or non-interference in the internal affairs of one another is a 
prominent feature of the ASEAN cooperation. It is envisaged in more or less all the leading 
documents,112 and is supported by the principle of consensus in decision-making. The 
importance of the principle can largely be explained by the history of the ASEAN countries, 
with colonialism, their recently acquired independence at the time of the founding of ASEAN 
and the subsequently rising disputes between the member states.113 Furthermore, the great 
diversity between, but also within, the member states means that they are sensitive to the 
possibilities of intervention.114   
 
Naturally, the principle of non-intervention is not an ASEAN invention, but a cornerstone of 
public international law, governing the inter-state relations in the international community. 
The principle has been discussed and questioned, especially since the new world order started 
to be shaped after the cold war and with the gradual emergence of the notion of universal 
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human rights as something that concerns the international community at large.115 The view 
that the protection of human rights is a legitimate concern of all nations was affirmed in the 
declaration on human rights from the Vienna conference in 1993.116 But while Western 
societies are more open to this view, the EU being a prominent example with emphasis on 
human rights and good governance in both internal and external relations, ASEAN still has a 
more traditional view on the matter. Discussing issues of sovereignty and interference in the 
context of regional integration can easily become a pseudo-discussion. The EU member states 
have for sure delegated more of their sovereign powers to the Union and have thereby to 
abide by a much more comprehensive set of rules than the ASEAN member states. However, 
that is not a question of diminishing sovereignty in its proper sense, since the decision to 
transfer the powers is taken by each member state according to their own constitutional 
principles.117 When, e.g., an EU member state faces sanctions by the Union on basis of a 
violation of EU rules, it is not a question of interference, but about using the Union’s means 
to prompt compliance with entered agreements. ASEAN member states have transferred very 
few of their sovereign powers to the association, but cooperate in many areas. This being said, 
it is useful for the understanding of ASEAN fundamental values to explore the notion of non-
intervention in ASEAN politics.    
 
According to Archya, the traditional ASEAN approach to non-intervention encompassed four 
main points in the inter-regional relations: 1) refraining from criticizing the actions of the 
governments of member states towards their own people; 2) criticizing actions of states which 
are perceived to constitute a breach of the principle of non-intervention; 3) denying 
recognition, sanctuary or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize or 
overthrow the government of a neighbouring state; and 4) providing political support and 
material assistance to member states in their actions against subversive activities.118 Even 
critical commentary against another Southeast Asian government in the national media was 
initially suppressed as constituting an infringement of the principle.119 It has also been 
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suggested that meetings organised by non-governmental groups were considered as 
constituting a breach of the principle of non-intervention if the meeting was meant to criticize 
another government.120 Funston states that the raison d’être of the principle of non-
intervention gradually shifted from a mechanism to contain differences between the countries 
into a means of supporting fellow leaders as the ties between the countries strengthened.121  
 
There have, however, been instances where ASEAN, albeit carefully, has expressed their 
worry over the internal situation in a member state. The rationale for this is likely that the 
domestic situation was perceived to affect the other member states or the association itself.122 
In a communiqué from 1986, the members at the time, minus the Philippines, called for a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict between pro and anti-government forces in Manila.123 
Internal crisis, menacing to deteriorate into civil war is thus the type of situation where the 
member states have acted with at least diplomatic pressure. This is also the case with the 
ASEAN policy towards Myanmar as will be assessed in section 3.3 below. Furthermore, 
ASEAN (or rather some of the ASEAN countries) has played a more or less important role in 
different conflicts in the region, such as the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia 
in 1978, the Cambodian coup d’état in 1997 and the political unrest in East Timor in 1999. 
However, the ASEAN involvement has been deployed with the consent of the states involved 
and largely under UN mandate.124 In other instances, such as the Indonesian invasion and 
annexation of East Timor in 1975-76 and the violence in 1991, ASEAN remained silent.  
 
3.1.2.2 A shift in policy 
Globally, the post cold war climate entailed a change in political priorities with greater 
emphasis on issues of human rights and democracy.125 ASEAN has found itself under 
pressure in this regard from the international (especially Western) community, international 
media and NGO’s. The admission of the CLMV countries and particularly Myanmar, the 
coup in Cambodia in 1997, the situation in East Timor, the haze-hazard stemming from 
Indonesia and the Asian financial crisis were all factors putting greater pressure on the 
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association, forcing it to step up and modify its interaction. The ASEAN action with regard to 
the Cambodian unrest in 1997 is by some seen as a step away from the principle of non-
intervention. By linking the Cambodian membership in ASEAN to the establishment of a 
credible, stable and legitimate government, ASEAN tried to influence the internal political 
dynamics in the country, thus not adhering to the principle of non-intervention as an absolute 
principle.126 However, the ASEAN action is also consistent with its previous policy of non-
intervention since it was the unconstitutional overthrow of an established government that 
prompted ASEAN to react. This type of domestic unrest can pose a threat to the security 
interests of ASEAN.  
 
Not incidentally, one of the earlier attempts to modify the ASEAN stance on non-intervention 
came after the financial crisis in 1997. In 1998, Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan127 
proposed a review of the principle, allowing member states to openly discuss each other’s 
internal affairs if they had an impact outside their borders. Named “constructive intervention”, 
the policy would be pro-active rather than reactive and would entail supportive assistance to 
countries that needed it.128 The proposal, watered down to the notion of “flexible 
engagement”, and limited to peer pressure and friendly advice did not go through.129 Instead, 
the notion of “enhanced interaction”, was introduced by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali 
Atlas, implying that non-intervention would still be the norm, but allowing states to voice 
their concerns over developments in one country that could affect them or the region.130 The 
term was first used in 1997 with regard to the haze issue in Indonesia.131 However, there are 
no agreed norms for which type of situations that would warrant collective concern and 
action. ASEAN still operates in its classic way, addressing events in a reactive way depending 
on the political circumstances of the moment.132 It is not certain that the concept of enhanced 
interaction is applicable to more sensitive political issues such as human rights.133 Severino 
states that there is no ground to intervene on basis of a country’s treatment of its citizens, 
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unless it is clear that the events in one country have an adverse affect in another member 
state.134 
 
3.1.2.3 Preliminary conclusions 
The modus operandi of non-interference has probably been a prerequisite for the very 
existence of ASEAN, given the tense relations at the time of the founding, and has been 
instrumental in marking Southeast Asian independence against external world powers. 
According to Kraft, the ASEAN concept of regionalism is founded on strict adherence to non-
intervention, the principle “paved the way for the consolidation of the norms, practices and 
mechanisms that eventually constituted ASEAN self-identification”.135 In this regard the 
principle can be seen as a building-block, rather than a stumbling-stone towards deeper 
integration. Wah takes the argument a bit further, claiming that ASEAN, given its positive 
track-record of handling intra-regional disputes, can be seen as a de facto security community 
and that this has been brought about by confidence building through non-intervention and 
consensus.136 Severino, however, argues that ASEAN politics is based on pragmatism and 
strategic concerns rather than any doctrine of non-intervention.137 This approach would 
explain why ASEAN has invoked the principle of non-intervention in such a selective way.138 
Such pragmatism also means that as the member states gain greater trust in each other, a 
different approach is possible. Kraft puts it as: “In the end, it is the confidence that states have 
in their neighbours that will make intervention (up to a certain degree) more palatable”.139 
 
In setting the limits for the permitted actions of the member states, the principle - and perhaps 
implicit value - of non-intervention has been instrumental in securing the values of national 
sovereignty, peace and stability in the region. However, there is no doubt that today, the 
modus operandi of non-intervention in ASEAN politics has become a stumbling-stone in the 
integration process, back-tying the member states from pushing for social transformation in 
the region and making it susceptible to charges that its mechanisms protect the regimes in 
power.140 There is a growing awareness of the necessity of cooperation to tackle trans-
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boundary issues, but questions of governance and human rights are still largely seen as 
domestic matters where the neighbours should not interfere.  
3.1.3 A new legal foundation 
The ASEAN Charter141 was signed during the 13th ASEAN summit in Singapore in 
November 2007 and now awaits national ratifications.142 Through the Charter, ASEAN gets a 
legal foundation and personality, more comprehensive rules of procedure and strengthened 
institutions.143 The Charter reaffirms ASEAN’s adherence to the principles of sovereignty, 
non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes and the purpose of ASEAN to maintain 
peace and stability. Supplementing these traditional norms of inter-state behaviour are the 
new purposes ASEAN has given itself: “To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance 
and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with 
due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN”.144 There is no 
definition of or reference to any specific practices that could help interpret what is meant by 
democracy and human rights in this context. However, the Charter states that ASEAN should 
act in accordance with the principle of “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and 
protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice.”145 The reference to social 
justice is an indication of the ASEAN emphasis on economic and social rights. The Charter 
furthermore provides for the establishment of a human rights body.146 The background to and 
implications of this provision will be discussed in the section on human rights and democracy 
below.  
 
The Secretary-General of ASEAN is through the Charter given the mandate to monitor the 
member states’ compliance with met agreements. Serious breaches of the Charter and non-
compliance with other agreements will be referred to the ASEAN Summit for a decision.147 
The Charter does not specify what such a decision could entail and there is no mentioning of 
any sanctions. Compared to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) Report that provided the basis 
for the Charter negotiations, these provisions are watered down. The group suggested that 
ASEAN should have power to take measures to redress cases of serious breaches of 
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ASEAN’s objectives, major principles and commitments to important agreements. Such 
measures would be decided upon by unanimity, but without the participation of the member 
state towards which the measure would be applied. It was suggested that the measures would 
include suspension of any of the rights and privileges of membership, such as withholding the 
right to participate in ASEAN activities and to chair ASEAN bodies and their meetings. The 
report also made the recommendation that unless otherwise decided by the ASEAN Council 
in exceptional circumstances, there should be no recourse to expulsion of membership.148 
These suggestions, in principle identical to the sanction-mechanism in art 7 TEU, deviates 
strongly from the ASEAN Way and did not make it into the Charter.  
 
The Charter, if and when signed, does not have much legal weight. Most provisions lack 
detail and there are no timeframes or sanctions provided for. Therefore, the document is 
basically worth as much as the leaders of the member states want to.149 Also, the ASEAN 
Way is still very much alive in the Charter, so no drastic changes are likely to occur. Former 
Secretary-general Ong Keng Yong stated that the Charter should be seen as a way to bring 
together the old and the new way of ASEAN, building on and reaffirming the principles of 40 
years of cooperation, i.e. consensus, non-intervention, reassuring that the integration happens 
in a pace comfortable to all, but at the same time containing new goals and possibilities for 
other ways in the future.150 This being said, it is going to be harder for the member states to 
get away with non-compliance and to claim that serious human rights violations are purely 
internal matters. The Charter makes questions of this sort a legitimate objective for ASEAN 
to pursue.151 But the potential intervention will lack coercive force and will rather fall back on 
the notion of “enhanced interaction”, i.e. it will be limited to diplomatic pressure and aid with 
the consent of the state in question.     
3.2 Human rights and democracy  
This section will assess human rights and democracy in the ASEAN context. The ASEAN 
(lack of) policy on these matters is greatly influenced by the Asian values debate and related 
schools of thought. The Asian values discourse is developed as a response to Western 
perceptions and policies and the section will therefore to a great extent be a comparison with 
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Western notions of democracy and human rights. This comparison will be taken further with 
regard to the EU in section 4 below.  
3.2.1 The Asian values debate  
The debate over human rights in Southeast Asia has been referred to as the Asian values 
debate and consists of the perception of a clash between Western values on one side, and 
Asian on the other side.152 This debate isn’t of mere academic interest since human rights 
issues have caused clashes between Asian countries and the West. ASEAN has criticized what 
it perceives to be the intrusive nature of the West’s human rights diplomacy.153 The most 
famous proponents of Asian values are Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew and 
Malaysian Mahathir, but the traditionally Western concept of human rights is regarded with 
some suspicion by all ASEAN countries. In Singapore, the ideology was largely developed to 
support state-building in a multi-ethnic society. The Malaysian perspective is more directly 
sceptic towards the West, legitimizing a soft authoritarian government dedicated to high 
economic growth.154 ASEAN has as an association at least tacitly given its support to the 
discourse, not least since it traditionally has refused to even discuss human rights issues, 
arguing that it is the member states domestic matter.155 
 
The Asian values discourse stems from the premise that international human rights norms and 
policies are shaped by the industrialized West. Hence, they are framed from within a Western 
liberal philosophy.156 Hernandez identifies the main points of divergence between ASEAN 
and Western human rights perspectives. These are inter alia: 1) the nature of human rights, 
i.e. whether they are universal or subject to cultural relativism; 2) the character of human 
rights, i.e. whether they are international or purely domestic concerns; 3) the importance of 
individual as opposed to community rights and Western emphasis on rights on the one hand 
and the ASEAN emphasis on duties on the other; and 4) the timing and sequencing of human 
rights implementation and observance.157 The Western notion of universal human rights as 
something that every human being possesses, and that cannot be denied a person regardless of 
the circumstances, is something that largely has been rejected by ASEAN ruling classes. 
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Instead, they emphasise that human rights are shaped by each country’s experiences, 
especially by religion and culture. Many ASEAN states thus subscribe to a cultural relativist 
view. Most ASEAN member states argue for the need to find a balance between individual 
rights and freedoms and the need to secure economic development. Far-going individual 
freedoms and rights are often seen as impairments to social stability and economic growth.158 
Instead, focus is on communitarian values, with the West being used as a deterrent example of 
how individualism and an atomic perception of society entail social disintegration, crime and 
drug abuse.159 The ASEAN perspective encompasses the view that meaningful enforcement 
and enjoyment of political and civil rights have economic prosperity as a prerequisite and this 
entails primacy of economic development over civil and political rights.160 Also, ASEAN 
opposes linking human rights to trade and development assistance, arguing that it constitutes 
trade protectionism and violates the peoples’ right to development.161 The West is often seen 
as hypocritical, pushing for human rights in a selective way depending on the national 
interests at stake.162 
 
The intergovernmental declaration of human rights from the preparatory meeting in Bangkok 
29 March – 2 April 1993 for the Vienna International Human Rights Conference in 1993 
gives a good picture of the ASEAN stance on human rights:  
 
”The Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, and reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993.They 
stressed that human rights are interrelated and indivisible comprising civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights. These rights are of equal importance. They should be addressed in a balanced and 
integrated manner and protected and promoted with due regard for specific cultural, social, economic and 
political circumstances. They emphasized that the promotion and protection of human rights should not 
be politicized. 
…They stressed that development is an inalienable right and that the use of human rights as a 
conditionality for economic cooperation and development assistance is detrimental to international 
cooperation and could undermine an international consensus on human rights. They emphasized that the 
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protection and promotion of human rights in the international community should take cognizance of the 
principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states. They were convinced that freedom, progress and national stability are promoted by a 
balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community, through which many individual 
rights are realized, as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”163 
Most ASEAN ruling elites furthermore argue that Western-style democracy is not a suitable 
form of government for their states, at least not at the particular stage in development where 
the county is. The underlying rationale is often that the religious, cultural and ethnical 
diversity makes the country fragile and that special social and political arrangements are 
needed (that most Westerners find undemocratic).164 Moreover, democracy is by some seen as 
an impediment to economic development.165  
 
It is first and foremost the ruling elites of ASEAN that advocates the outlined discourse. 
Although generally sceptic towards Western universalist interpretations of human rights, civil 
society and regional NGO’s do not necessarily share the views of the elite (or rather the 
authoritarian implications of these views).166 Hence, speaking about Asian values is 
somewhat misdirected. Also, the outline of the main points of divergence between Western 
and ASEAN perspectives on human rights does not mean that the attitude towards democracy 
and human rights is the same in all ASEAN states. While it is probably true that all ASEAN 
member states regard the Western agenda with some suspicion, they differ largely in forms of 
governance and policies on human rights. The Philippines has been democratic since 1986 
and is the ASEAN member states where the citizens - at least on paper - have had their human 
rights largely met through the ratification of many international human rights instruments 
dealing with a variety of human rights, incorporated human rights in laws and the constitution 
and an independent, constitutionally-based human rights-body. However, the country is 
tainted with deteriorating living standards, political unrest and violence. Singapore has a high 
standard of living and the citizens enjoy economic and socio-cultural rights, but the mode of 
government is soft authoritarianism based on repression of civil and political rights. The 
Singaporean rigid upholding of the principle of non-discrimination between different ethnic 
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and religious groups can be contrasted to the Malaysian policy of affirmative action for the 
ethnic Malay. With the four newer member states, the gap between systems and perspectives 
on human rights gets even wider, with Myanmar as the most repressive society in ASEAN.  
3.2.2 Changing discourse? 
The underpinning of the Southeast Asian discourse on human rights and governance was to a 
great extent the economic growth and development that took place in the region during the 
post-colonial era and especially during the “miracle years” in the 1990’s. It gave legitimacy to 
the authoritarian rule and lack of freedom in the Asian states - so called “performance 
legitimacy”.167 The financial and economic crisis that swept through Asia in 1997-98 caused 
political and social unrest in the affected countries, making states that had legitimized their 
rule on economic performance vulnerable to domestic criticism. The most striking example 
was Indonesia, where the Suharto government was thrown over, paving way for democratic 
elections and improved protection of human rights.  
 
The nature of the discourse on human rights changed in the wake of the financial crisis and 
some even proclaimed the Asian values debate dead.168 The most striking example of this 
change is the inclusion of a provision on an ASEAN human rights body in the ASEAN 
Charter and the explicit mentioning of human rights and democracy in the purposes and 
principles of ASEAN. There have, however, been earlier mentions of human rights in 
ASEAN discourse, marking the departure from Asian values and the strict adherence to non-
intervention.169 The ASEAN ministerial meeting in 1998 welcomed the establishment of a 
non-governmental Working Group on an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism.170 The vitality 
of civil society in many of the ASEAN member states can, according to Kraft, be seen as one 
of the clearer signs of the improvement of the regional climate on human rights.171 However, 
the Asian values rhetoric and policy is, albeit more nuanced, still present in ASEAN member 
states.172  
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The perspective on human rights in ASEAN is inter-linked with the notion of non-
intervention. Thus, the debate over and slight modification of, the principle of non-
intervention is crucial for the ASEAN course on human rights issues. Notwithstanding the 
change in discourse in these areas, solidarity between the ASEAN leaders has been given 
priority over human rights and democracy policy concerns this far.173 Most ASEAN leaders 
are first and foremost strategic, safeguarding national interest and stability in the region, and 
only secondarily interested in the promotion and protection of human rights. This situation is 
complicated by the fact that according to the Asian values discourse, democracy and human 
rights promotion can have negative effects on political stability and economic development. 
Last but not least, intervening in somebody else’s business means that the own domestic 
politics is open to interference. It is here that the main clash between ASEAN and the West 
lie. The Western concept of human rights entails international accountability for human rights 
violations. ASEAN on the other hand still argue that to a great extent, this is a domestic 
matter. Several ASEAN countries tends to omit signing international conventions on human 
rights, even though they might respect the rights in question, for the very reason that they 
don’t want to be held internationally accountable.174 The underlying reason for this can be the 
reluctance of the ASEAN ruling elites to share political power with a greater part of 
society.175  
3.2.3 An ASEAN Human Rights Body and Charter 
By contrast to the European experience, there is no ASEAN mechanism for the protection of 
human rights. The ASEAN Charter contains a provision to create a human rights body within 
ASEAN.176 However, the mode of functioning and terms of reference of the body are to be 
decided later by the ministerial meeting.177 There is no time frame set for this, and it is 
extremely unlikely that this will happen for a long time, given the diverging view on human 
rights between the member states and the unwillingness to give up sovereign powers. Any 
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mechanism agreed upon will most likely only have a consultative function or moral influence 
and definitely no supranational powers. This was expressed rather clearly by Singaporean 
Foreign Minister Yeo on a future ASEAN human rights body:”I’m not sure it will have teeth 
but it will certainly have a tongue…the human rights body will have the right to admonish, to 
criticise, to encourage. It will certainly have moral influence if nothing else.”178  
 
According to Severino and Kesavapany, it is only feasible for ASEAN to focus on specific 
human rights, like the protection of minorities, women and children and the innocent practice 
on religion.179 All ASEAN countries are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
and all member states have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. The original five member states and Vietnam have ratified 
the ILO 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. The ASEAN human rights body 
could thus monitor compliance with these agreements and initiate similar consensus on 
others. Also, Severino suggests that it should be possible to lay down a few ground rules that 
no state could openly reject, such as strictures against genocide, the use of rape as an 
instrument of state power or as a weapon of war, the worst forms of child labour, deployment 
of child soldiers and the curtailment of the freedom to practice one’s religion in a way that 
doesn’t offend others.180 
3.3 Myanmar  
After having looked at the basic principles constituting ASEAN, these will be assessed with 
regard to the ASEAN policy on Myanmar.  
3.3.1 “Constructive engagement” 
Myanmar was admitted ASEAN membership in 1997. Questions of governance, treatment of 
the own population and other domestic matters are not pertinent as membership criteria in 
ASEAN and it was early evident that ASEAN aspired to encompass all Southeast Asian 
states. Through the admittance, ASEAN could gain external political bargaining power at the 
same time as strategically creating closer ties with its neighbours. It has been suggested that 
Myanmar’s reasons for joining were connected to its need of allies, facing condemnation and 
sanctions by the West. It is also likely that Myanmar tried to gain external and internal 
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legitimacy from joining the association.181 The ASEAN dialogue partners, notably the US and 
EU, protested against the decision to admit Myanmar as a member, given its poor track-record 
on human rights.182 It is likely that the West’s efforts were counter-productive, spurring 
ASEAN to unite Southeast Asia.183 Concerns were also raised within ASEAN.184 Singapore’s 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong justified the decision to admit Myanmar by invoking the 
principle of non-intervention: “we have always taken the position that the internal situation of 
a country is that country’s concern”.185 At the time of admission, the Malaysian foreign 
minister brushed off the concerns that the human rights situation in Myanmar could 
deteriorate after the admission, and “hoped” that the membership would make the policy of 
constructive engagement more effective.186 
 
It has been stated that ASEAN showed double standards when it admitted Myanmar in 1997, 
but postponed the Cambodian accession until 1999 due to the coup and following political 
unrest just before the 1997 summit. The argument goes that the Myanmar and the Cambodian 
records of repression were equivalent.187 Notwithstanding this, ASEAN acted consistent with 
its established policy since Cambodia was in a state of chaos threatening to deteriorate into 
civil war, while the military junta in Myanmar had control over the territory. The key to 
understanding the ASEAN course of action is not to look at the level of repression, but rather 
at its strategic security concerns and its tendency to support fellow leaders in power. 
However, the ASEAN policy of “constructive engagement” towards Myanmar can be seen as 
intervention in the sense that it is aimed towards domestic policies. The goal of the policy is 
to break the country’s isolation and promote regional security and socio-economic 
development by engaging Myanmar in regional cooperation through dialogue and 
persuasion.188 The junta has, however, constantly denied that the goal of constructive 
engagement is to change Myanmar.189 Sanctions and coercion are ruled out. ASEAN leaders 
have until 2007 only expressed rather careful statements on the situation in Myanmar, 
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“urging” and “encouraging” the military junta to work towards national reconciliation and the 
smooth transition to democracy through dialogue with all concerned parties and the release of 
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.190 
 
Constructive engagement is linked to the principle of non-intervention and also reflects 
ASEAN’s pragmatism. Archya claims that the policy of constructive engagement is not a 
strictly neutral approach, but rather “a form of interference consistent with ASEAN’s 
traditional support for a regime in power”. 191 There are several reasons for ASEAN to refrain 
from taking a tougher line on Myanmar. Such a line could push the country into the arms of 
China and it could also undermine ASEAN’s own security interests since poverty and 
political unrest in one country easily affects the whole region. Moreover, it is a well known 
secret that several of the most influential ASEAN members, notably Singapore, has 
substantial economic interests in the country and closer ties to the junta than they like to 
admit.192 In the public discourse, ASEAN leaders stresses that sanctions against Myanmar 
would be counter-productive in pushing the country into deeper isolation and that it would be 
the poorest that would be most affected.193  
3.3.2 A new precedent 
The work on the charter was almost complete when a crisis in Myanmar was sparked in 
September 2007 by the public protests over dramatically increased prices on fuel. It was 
mainly Buddhist monks peacefully taking to the streets in the biggest mass protests in 
Myanmar since 1988. The junta answered with a bloody crackdown on the protesters. Human 
Rights Watch has documented the killing of 20 persons but believe that the real number is 
much higher. Hundreds of protestors remain in detention.194 ASEAN leaders reacted quickly 
and more forcefully than they had ever done before. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Yeo issued 
a statement on behalf of the ASEAN foreign ministers in September 2007:  
 
The ASEAN foreign ministers were “appalled to receive reports on automatic weapons being used and 
demanded that the Myanmar government immediately desist from the use of force against demonstrators. 
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They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar foreign minister Nyan Win over reports that the 
demonstrators in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of 
fatalities. They strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost restraint and seek a political solution. They 
called upon Myanmar to resume its efforts to work towards a peaceful transition to democracy. The 
ministers called for the release of detainee Aung San Suu Kyi.  
 
The ASEAN foreign ministers expressed their concern to minister Nyan Win that the developments in 
Myanmar had serious impact on the reputation and credibility of ASEAN.”195   
 
In using the terms “appalled”, “revulsion”, “demanded” and “strongly urged”, this is the 
strongest statement from the ASEAN leaders in the history of ASEAN. ASEAN found it 
impossible to keep on defending Myanmar before the international community or they would 
have lost all credibility.196 However, sanctions or expulsion are impossible alternatives for 
ASEAN.197 Malaysia’s foreign minister Datuk Seri explained the ASEAN position, saying 
that besides the fact that it would be counter-productive to expel or use sanctions against 
Myanmar, “there is no mechanism for suspension in ASEAN. ASEAN will never take that 
route”.198 There have been calls from within ASEAN for sanctions towards the junta and even 
expulsion, but these haven’t had any effect on the ASEAN leaders.199 Instead, dialogue with 
the junta and the neighbouring giants, i.e. China, Japan and India together with support for the 
UN special envoy to Myanmar is the ASEAN way to handle the situation.200  
 
It seems as if ASEAN has acted according to the principle of enhanced interaction, 
reaffirming its position in ASEAN politics and perhaps broadening its scope of application to 
situations that do not directly and physically affect the other member states, although a violent 
crackdown on demonstrators most certainly threatens the regional security and the region’s 
external relations.201 More importantly, the strong wording of the statement suggests the 
emergence or strengthening of a norm for the member states’ domestic behaviour. It had 
already been expressed in more diplomatic terms in the 1986 communiqué on the political 
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unrest and violence in the Philippines. The emerging norm seems to be that a member state 
should exercise utmost restraint and seek a political solution in situations of public protests 
and domestic unrest.  
3.4 ASEAN values  
ASEAN is aspiring to become an ASEAN Community.202 Policy-makers in ASEAN are 
realizing that a community has to be built on a shared sense of regional identity and to some 
extent the existence of common values. As outlined in the previous sections, the common 
principles and implicit values of ASEAN are respect for national sovereignty, non-
interference in the domestic affairs of each other, peaceful resolution of conflicts and non-
threat and non-use of force. The underlying rationale of the principles is to secure peace and 
stability. Furthermore, economic development is given a prominent place in ASEAN policy. 
The means to achieve the economic development is after European model with the 
establishment of an economic community with a free flow of goods, services, skilled labour 
and capital. This emphasis on market economy is balanced by the goals “to alleviate poverty 
and narrow the development gap within ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation” 
and ”to enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them 
with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and justice”.203  
 
The ASEAN principles and values mainly concern inter-state relations. However, something 
additional is required if ASEAN wants to deepen its integration and become a true peoples’ 
community. In order to achieve this, ASEAN needs to establish norms on the conduct of 
states towards their own citizens. However, there is little consensus on what those norms 
could be and the inclusion of human rights and democracy in the ASEAN Charter can today 
merely be seen as aspirations.  When leaving the grand, all-encompassing notions and values, 
there are basic rules on the treatment by states of their own people that ASEAN should be 
able to agree on. As already outlined with regard to human rights, there is some common 
ground. There are also emerging norms relating to a government’s handling of political unrest 
as shown by the ASEAN policy on Myanmar. Severino suggests that, at least for public 
consumption, the peaceful resolution of political disputes through dialogue, free and peaceful 
elections, democracy as the end-goal of the political process, and broad participation in the 
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process, including the opposition, seem to be shared values of the ASEAN member states.204 
However, it is doubtful whether these more far-reaching norms really are embraced as 
common values by ASEAN. 
 
Furthermore, the ASEAN flexibility with regard to different situations means that what seem 
to be common values do not necessarily have to be regarded as universally applicable norms, 
but rather as responses to specific situations.205 Thus, the emerging norms would be 
strengthened if the enhanced interaction of ASEAN would be institutionalized and not applied 
ad hoc. By clearly defining which situations would come under regional scrutiny, the Charter 
provisions on human rights and democracy would not be mere rhetoric, but could serve as 
building-stones for further expansion of the promotion and protection of human rights and 
democracy in the region. This would of course be a deviation from the traditional ASEAN 
Way. However, such development is necessary if ASEAN is serious about the new objectives 
it has given itself through the Charter.  
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4 Comparative analysis 
4.1 A historical perspective 
Europe and Southeast Asia share many traits - they are both regions at the end of a great 
continent, shattered into several nation states, with the superpowers China and the Soviet 
Union/Russia respectively casting its long shadows. Marked by different hardships, Europe 
by WWII and Southeast Asia by colonialism and rising disputes and rivalry between the 
newly independent states, the states in both regions chose to work together to secure peace 
and stability. However, the modes of cooperation were radically different. While ASEAN 
dealt with its fragile relations through assurances of respect for national sovereignty and non-
interference, Europe, in the aftermaths of WW2, set up supranational institutions with the 
joint management of the means of war, i.e. coal, steel and atom-energy, in order to prevent the 
conflicts from resurging again and continued this path with strong supranational institutions. 
Thus, both ASEAN and the EU started out as peace projects created to ensure regional 
stability, but whereas ASEAN achieved this through strengthening the nation state, the EU on 
the other hand chose to bridge over the nation state.  
 
An explanation offered by Severino to these different approaches to regional cooperation 
takes account of the fact that Europe is rather homogenous compared to Southeast Asia.206 
While there was relative hegemony in Western Europe in certain regards, such as religion, 
ethnicity and emerging norms on governance and fundamental principles, no such common 
platform existed in Southeast Asia. This is to a great extent still true today. Furthermore, the 
regionalisation process in Western Europe was spurred by the threat from the expanding 
Soviet Union. China did not pose such a direct threat to the founding members of ASEAN, 
even if domestic communist insurgency was seen as a problem in several member states.207 
Hence, the need for ASEAN to stand strongly united in the cold war era was perhaps not as 
great as the need to mark sovereignty towards one another and contain the disputes within the 
region. The situation in post-colonial Southeast Asia has been compared to the process of 
state-making in Europe between the 14th and 19th centuries, albeit concentrated within a 
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much shorter time frame.208 Non-interference and the other behavioural norms that constitute 
ASEAN are reflective of the stress of nation-building in post-colonial Southeast Asia.  
 
Against the background of the fundamental differences between the ASEAN and EU 
approaches to regional integration, the EU as a model of regional integration has traditionally 
not had great influence on the course of ASEAN. As pointed out by Severino, there is a fear 
among ASEAN policy makers “to be like the EU”.209 EU has perhaps even to some extent has 
been a deterring example. The perceived lack of economic dynamics within the EU paired 
with the economic rise of Asia has been one factor validating that the European way is not 
desirable. EU is sometimes associated with inflexible institutions, bureaucracy and detailed 
regulations. There has, however, been a notable change in the economic field where ASEAN 
is aiming at the creation of an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 with a free flow of 
goods, services, skilled labour and a freer flow of capital, aiming at a single market and 
production base. More recently, the signing of the ASEAN Charter indicates that the EU to a 
greater extent is becoming an inspiration to ASEAN. The EPG that was established by the 
ASEAN heads of states/governments with the mandate to give recommendations for an 
ASEAN Charter, and the High Level Task Force that negotiated the Charter, both visited the 
EU for inspiration during the drafting of and negotiations on the Charter. On commenting on 
the EU-ASEAN relation in conjunction with the commemorative summit held between the 
regions back-to-back with the ASEAN Summit and Charter-signing ceremony in November 
2007, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Yeo stated that “ASEAN Countries find in the European 
integration great inspiration for our own integration…I don’t think our integration will ever 
go as far as Europe’s but your footsteps, including your missteps, are a guide to us in our 
journey”.210 
4.2 Protection of regional values 
4.2.1 The means 
 
The EU mechanism for constitutional discipline, art 7 TEU, has no equivalent in the ASEAN 
legal body. However, there are mechanisms to ensure adherence to fundamental values, albeit 
of an ad hoc character.  When the stability of the region has been threatened, e.g. in the 
Philippines in 1986 and in Myanmar in 2007, ASEAN has acted with diplomatic pressure. 
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The policy of enhanced interaction is the basis for discussion of domestic matters with 
regional implications although the principle of non-intervention regularly is invoked in order 
to keep domestic matters of the regional agenda. The ASEAN foreign minister’s strong 
statement with regard to the violent crackdown on protesters in Myanmar indicates that 
ASEAN is ready to take a tougher line on member states domestic policies if they seriously 
contradict the association’s norms or values. Furthermore, the Charter institutionalizes the 
possibility for the ASEAN Summit to take a decision in case of a member state’s serious 
breach of the Charter provisions.211 However, the Charter does not provide for any sanctions 
(contradictory to the suggestion in the EPG Report). Hence, at first glance, the ASEAN 
system seems to be quite different from the European.  
 
However, the two systems have similar implications. Art 7 TEU is highly political in its 
nature and the lack of judicial control means that any action is subject to the Council’s 
discretion. The Haider affair clearly shows this where the member states even preferred to 
keep its actions outside the Union’s framework. Thus, both the ASEAN and the EU way of 
promoting compliance with fundamental values contain a high degree of political discretion. 
Moreover, the consequences of the policies might be similar, although ASEAN cannot resort 
to sanctions. E.g., one of the possible sanctions under art 7 TEU is suspension of 
chairmanship. In 2005, ASEAN leaders persuaded Myanmar to pass on its ASEAN 
chairmanship for 2006-07 after both internal and external pressure.212 Myanmar voluntarily 
passed on the chairmanship, stating that it was going to concentrate on its national process of 
reconciliation, and the ASEAN leaders expressed their “sincere appreciation to the 
government of Myanmar for not allowing its national preoccupation to affect ASEAN’s 
solidarity and cohesiveness”.213 There are more strict sanctions available in the EU arsenal, 
such as the suspension of the right to vote in the Council. However, if the Haider affair is a 
benchmark for measures likely to be taken, toning down of diplomatic relations is a more 
plausible “sanction”. Hence, the results of EU and ASEAN action might be similar, although 
the situations on which the associations act are radically different in nature.   
 
A second point of convergence is the use of a coordinated bilateral approach, rather than a 
multilateral with regard to sensitive issues. This type of action was used by the EU member 
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states against Austria and is largely pre-empted in the future after the revision of art 7 TEU. 
However, it is instructive to compare this to ASEAN, where the member states have acted 
coordinated in their own capacity, rather than as an association in delicate matters. This was 
the case with Southeast Asian participation in the UN peacekeeping operation in East Timor 
in 1999-2000.214 This suggests that for the most sensitive matters, the member states of the 
regional organizations like to keep its actions outside the scrutiny of a regional institutional 
framework. Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General of ASEAN, suggested at a seminar in 
Singapore after the summits in 2007 that he could imagine a similar course of action for 
Myanmar, i.e. that the member states act on a coordinated bilateral level rather than 
multilateral, reaching out as neighbours.215 Such a scenario would allow the member states 
that are ready to act, whereas the others can wait.216 The EU member states would also be 
able to act in this manner in the not unlikely scenario that the European Council was unable to 
reach consensus on an alleged breach of the European values by a member state.   
 
Having looked at the similarities between the systems, an important point has to be made on 
the different functions. Art 7 TEU serves its function as a symbol for and safeguard of 
European values. It is instrumental in ensuring respect for the EU law as the supreme law of 
the land. In ASEAN, any interventionist policy is still reactive rather than proactive. The 
flexibility and ad hoc character of ASEAN policy makes it not a means to ensure 
constitutional discipline, but more pragmatically, a means to handle situations threatening the 
regional stability.  
4.2.2 The values protected 
 
If ASEAN and the EU resemble each other to some extent when it comes to the means of 
promoting compliance with fundamental values, they differ all the more when it comes to the 
values protected. This is obvious when comparing what situations comes under regional 
scrutiny in the two systems - the repressive regime in Myanmar compared to the 
democratically elected government with a suspicious agenda in Austria. The EU has come 
much further in finding common principles and values that constitute a platform for the 
integration. These are not limited to norms of inter-state behaviour but have the relations 
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between the member states’ governments and their citizens as subjects. ASEAN still puts its 
weight on norms of inter-state behaviour, in order to secure peace and stability. However, 
there is, through the inclusion of the principles of democracy and the protection of human 
rights in the ASEAN Charter, an emerging tendency in ASEAN to include norms regarding 
the member states’ treatment of their own citizens.  
 
Starting with the norms of inter-state behaviour, these are also endorsed by the EU. However, 
the norms in question are interpreted differently. The principle of non-intervention is not that 
pertinent in the EU context since the idea of a post-national entity defies the concept of 
national sovereignty. However, it is not generally accepted that this is the nature of the EU. 
Hence, the issue of sovereignty remains controversial but is presented in terms of division of 
competence between the Union and the member states and ultimately prompts the question of 
who is the master of the Treaty. The ASEAN discourse on non-intervention indicates that the 
association, at least in more sensitive areas, has not moved beyond classic international 
cooperation. Moreover, where ASEAN considers human rights and governance issues to be a 
more or less domestic affair, the EU approach is that concern for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms ”cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a state 
and constitute an important and legitimate part of their dialogue with third countries”.217 
  
As outlined earlier, the ASEAN emphasis on the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention 
and peaceful settlement of disputes is instrumental in securing stability in the region. ASEAN 
and EU are similar in this sense, since they both started as peace projects and stabilizing 
factors in turbulent times. However, whereas regional stability usually provides the rationale 
for ASEAN policy, the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law has been given a prominent place in EU policy. This can partly be explained by the two 
regions looking differently at the empirical link between these factors. A school of thought in 
Southeast Asia within the Asian values discourse emphasises the need for economic 
development and political stability in order for the citizens to enjoy their rights, some even 
claiming that too far reaching human rights and democracy can pose a threat to economic 
development and political stability.  The causal link between human rights and democracy on 
one side and development and stability on the other is perceived radically differently in EU 
policy, where democracy and the protection of human rights are seen as prerequisites for 
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peace, stability and socio-economic development.218 However, it is also possible that 
democracy and human rights are independent values in the EU and not in any respect 
instrumental. Furthermore, the focus on political stability and economic development in 
several Southeast Asian societies does not necessarily have a more open, participatory society 
where citizens can enjoy their rights fully as an end-goal. The Asian values discourse is often 
seen as an elite discourse justifying repressive, or at least authoritarian, regimes. As an 
example, the Singaporean society has not opened up much during the past decades, despite 
flourishing economy (except in the aftermaths of the Asian financial crisis) and a stable 
political situation. The EU promotion of its values can also be criticized as serving other, less 
altruistic, interests. However, this critique largely regards the Union’s external policies with 
regard to especially trade and development aid. This theme and the possible clashes between 
the EU and ASEAN will be discussed further in the concluding remarks in section 5 below.   
     
ASEAN has through the signing of the ASEAN Charter committed to the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. This implies a shift in policies 
that can reflect that the association is moving towards a more European-style type of 
constitutional discipline, where the member states domestic affairs are subject to regional 
scrutiny. However the only thing that is clear about this control in the ASEAN context is that 
it is going to be severely limited and the concepts of democracy and human rights are most 
likely going to have either a very minimal or an extremely open interpretation. This contrasts 
to the European system, where human rights are rather clearly defined, largely due to the 
European Convention and the case law of the European Court. The ECJ has also given regard 
to human rights in its judgements for quite some time. Furthermore, the Charter of 
fundamental rights of the EU is given binding legal force through ToL, which will further 
strengthen and refine the rights of the EU citizens. When putting the EU policy on human 
rights in the context of the Asian values discourse that is more general in its critique of the 
West, it is notable that whereas the EU certainly claims human rights to be universal and a 
legitimate international concern, it does not solely emphasize civil and political rights. The 
EU official policy (as is the UN policy) is that human rights are indivisible and the EU 
Charter of fundamental rights contains civil and political, as well as social and economic 
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rights.219 However, economic and social rights have traditionally been given less 
consideration and a lower level of protection. The European Convention does not contain the 
latter type of rights, but they are contained in the European Social Charter that does not enjoy 
the status and enforceability of the Convention.  
 
In lifting the perspective, and assessing the function of common values in the regions, both 
differences and similarities can be found. In the EU, the common values serve an important 
function as the glue of integration. The idea is that differences in traditions, culture etc. are 
balanced by a shared set of values. Interestingly, the ASEAN Charter paraphrases the EU 
motto of “Unity in diversity”, and cherishing the diversity is something that the EU and 
ASEAN have in common. 220 However, ASEAN has rather emphasised the classic norms of 
inter-state behaviour in order to ensure respect for the member states’ national identities and 
to secure stability. Certainly, these ASEAN principles can be seen as the glue of co-operation, 
but over-emphasis on norms relating to national sovereignty makes deeper integration hard to 
achieve. The values emphasised by the EU and ASEAN respectively are reflective of and 
support the different paths the organizations have taken with regard to state sovereignty. 
ASEAN traditionally encompasses common principles that strengthen state sovereignty. By 
contrast, the EU protection and promotion of its common values regard the member states’ 
treatment of their own citizens, subjecting the member states to a constitutional discipline 
unheard of in traditional international or regional organizations.    
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5 Concluding remarks 
 
Through the comparative analysis in this thesis, several similarities but also great differences 
have been found between EU and ASEAN with regard to their regional systems for protection 
of common values. Whereas the greatest difference of the systems as such is that the EU has a 
proactive approach and ASEAN has a reactive, pragmatic take on things, the actual 
consequences of the two systems are quite similar. However, the EU member states are 
subject to a constitutional discipline that would be unthinkable in ASEAN where the common 
values instead relate to state sovereignty. The EU has reached consensus and elaborated 
certain norms regarding the member states’ behaviour towards their own citizens, i.e. 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In ASEAN, the inclusion of these norms in the 
ASEAN Charter can be seen as a step in the same direction. However, there is currently no 
consensus on the content of these norms. Hence, they have the character of aspirations and the 
importance given to the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention means that they 
most likely will remain so. These differences between the two regional entities should not 
conceal the fact that both ASEAN and the EU, in the wake of their conflict-ridden history, 
share the same overriding goals - to create peace and stability and to ensure economic 
development through regional cooperation and integration.  
 
Having assessed the EU and ASEAN from an internal point of view, the question lurks what 
consequences the aforementioned similarities and differences might have for their bilateral 
and multilateral relations. As outlined in the introduction, the EU and ASEAN are 
cooperating in many fields and plan to expand and deepen their relations in several areas. This 
would perhaps not be viable, if there were not some shared aspirations between the two 
regions. The EC Commission finds this to be the case, stating that ”The EU and South East 
Asia share enough interests and values to work together for a new partnership aiming at 
reinvigorating and guiding their relationship”.221 Cherishing diversity and the commitment to 
regional integration paired with strong multilateral institutions are the identified common 
values.222 The shared interests are primarily economic and political-strategic.223 Despite this 
resolve to work together, the different policies and underlying values of the EU and ASEAN 
might cause complications in their relations with each other. The differences that can arise 
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(and have arisen) are largely due to the diverging views on the protection and promotion of 
human rights and democracy, linked to the question of what constitutes interference in the 
domestic affairs of a state. It is largely in the context of the EU policy of promoting these 
values in its external relations, especially in linking them to trade and development assistance 
that these issues are risking to become contentious.224 Promoting the Union’s values is part of 
the EU external policy, as stated in art 2.5 TEU as amended by ToL –”In its relations with the 
wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the 
protection of its citizens”.225 On the contrary, ASEAN external relations are characterized by 
openness, and the values they might export are primarily the basic rules of inter-state 
behaviour, i.e. non-interference in the internal affairs of one another and the renouncement of 
the threat or use of force against other states.226 ASEAN is aspiring to play “a pivotal role in 
the international fora” and to be in the driving seat of regional integration in the Asia-Pacific 
region.227  
 
The EU practice in its external relations of using conditionality related to the domestic 
situation of the counter part has by ASEAN largely been seen as constituting interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries and an unjust way of imposing European standards.228 
These arguments are fuelled by the fact that the EU foreign policy is inconsistent and 
therefore is susceptible to accusations of double standards and euro-centrism, despite the 
universal values it claims to uphold.229 For example, EU has shown greater ease in resorting 
to negative measures for violations of human rights towards “poor, marginal countries” such 
as sub-Saharan Africa.230 On the contrary, the policy towards China is “constructive 
engagement”, based on the assumption that increased contacts with European partners almost 
automatically should bring liberalisation to the Chinese economy and subsequently politics. 
Despite the lack of results of this policy, EU has not chosen a more confrontational strategy, 
but relies on a dialogue approach.231 These inconsistencies can be explained by the fact that 
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there often are numerous principles conflicting in a given situation and that strategic and 
economic interests usually are prioritized over principles and values.232 ASEAN furthermore 
claims that linking issues of human rights and democracy to trade concessions and 
development assistance impedes the economic development of the targeted countries and that 
this violates the human rights of people in the affected countries.233 Hence, ASEAN does not 
necessarily reject the EU values, but questions the motives and the means used to promote 
them.  
 
Against this background, different layers of ASEAN-EU relations will be assessed and the EU 
policies in different contexts will be outlined.234 Starting with the interaction between the EU 
and ASEAN in the multilateral fora ARF and ASEM, it is mainly “the Myanmar issue” that 
has posed concrete problems this far. As outlined earlier, Myanmar renounced their ASEAN 
chairmanship after American and EU threats of boycotting the ARF.235 EU refused to admit 
Myanmar into the ASEM process until the EU Eastern enlargement forced the EU to admit 
Myanmar in order to grant access to the new EU member states. However, Myanmar is only 
allowed to represent on a lower than head of state/government level.236 A similar situation 
came up when Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 and wanted to accede to the 1980 
Cooperation Agreement between the two regions. Diplomatic contortions had to be deployed 
since ASEAN would not leave Myanmar outside.237 The Union regularly uses the framework 
of the ASEM process and of EU-ASEAN meetings to raise its concerns over the situation in 
Myanmar and it was one of the key issues at the EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 
November 2007.238 At this Summit, the regions reaffirmed that they had common goals 
regarding Myanmar, i.e. peaceful transition to democracy and the release of political 
detainees, but that they differed as to their strategy.239 Whereas ASEAN uses the outlined 
approach of constructive engagement towards Myanmar, the EU has imposed economic 
sanctions. In later years, the sanctions have been nuanced in an attempt to avoid hitting the 
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more vulnerable parts of the population.240 Despite this, ASEAN considers any sanction to be 
counter productive, and the constructive engagement makes it susceptible to European 
critique for neglecting to take any real action on the Myanmar issue and on the contrary 
providing it legitimacy. Although both the EU and ASEAN attempt to find common ground 
for discussing the issue of Myanmar, it is a subject that, due to differences in values and the 
approach of what constitutes legitimate intervention, regularly becomes contentious between 
the two regions.  
 
Bilateral relations between the EU and individual ASEAN member states supplement the 
regional level cooperation. The EU is currently re-negotiating several of its older PCA’s with 
Southeast Asian states. As a policy, the EU wants to include an “essential element” clause in 
all bilateral agreements with countries in South East Asia. This clause stipulates that respect 
for fundamental human rights and democratic principles, as laid down in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, underpins the internal and external policies of the parties and 
constitutes an “essential element” of the agreement.241 Through this clause, the EU links 
democracy and human rights to trade concessions and development assistance. The old 
agreements with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia contain this clause, whereas the agreements 
with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand do not.242 The EU is 
currently negotiating new PCA’s with Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam.243 According to a Filipino official, the EU demands 
inclusion of the essential elements clause in the PCA negotiated with the Philippines. The 
country’s track-record of extra-judicial killings is seen as particularly problematic.244 The 
PCA’s are linked to a future ASEAN-EU FTA in the sense that political clauses can be 
incorporated in the PCA’s rather than risking over-stretching the FTA.245  
 
Even though the EU still is a major contributor to Southeast Asia through development and 
technical assistance, ASEAN and the EU are slowly moving from a donor-recipient 
relationship to a more equal partnership.246 This reflects the shift that is taking place in 
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economic power between Europe and Asia and the fact that several Southeast Asian nations 
have developed considerably during the past decades. Furthermore, the EU uses the 
cooperation with ASEAN as a cornerstone for the increasingly important dialogue in the 
wider Asian region.247 The current PCA negotiations between the EU and Vietnam are a part 
of this development, where the social-economic development of Vietnam has prompted the 
EU to negotiate a new, broader partnership agreement with the country. Human rights are on 
the agenda, but it is unlikely that this will be a contentious subject.248 Conflicts can arise if the 
EU tries to push the more influential and developed ASEAN member states into accepting the 
essential element clause, since international accountability and conditionality for domestic 
conditions largely is rejected by the ASEAN member states. However, the potential conflicts 
surrounding these clauses should not be exaggerated since all ASEAN member states pay at 
least lip service to the principles of democracy and human rights (as shown by the signing of 
the ASEAN Charter). Furthermore, the essential elements clauses are highly unlikely to be 
invoked by the EU in other than extreme circumstances.  
 
After having assessed potential conflicts with regard to the EU policy in bilateral relations, 
especially in the relation to development assistance, the possibly contentious area of trade 
linked to issues of human rights and democracy will now be assessed. EU is influential in the 
WTO and its policies there do to some extent reflect the values that the EU wants to promote. 
This is first and foremost the case with its policies on social standards and environmental 
protection, where the EU is committed to linking these factors to trade. The EU has e.g. 
suspended Myanmar’s GSP privileges as part of the Union’s economic sanctions.249 It is 
possible to argue that protectionist interests are behind the EU position on these matters. 
However, the EU policy is not that developing countries must have the same level of 
protection as the EU. Instead, there is an understanding that a higher level of development 
needs to be reached before adopting stricter standards. Positive inducements are used, notably 
lower tariffs under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP), in order to encourage 
developing countries to abide by basic standards.250 ASEAN on the other hand does not 
believe that the solution to poor labour standards in the developing world lies in linking these 
issues to trade. Instead, they argue that they should be dealt with in other international fora, 
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such as the International Labour Organization (ILO).251 The different regional policies on 
trade and social conditions become all the more evident in the context of an ASEAN-EU 
FTA. 
 
The FTA negotiations between the two regions were launched in 2007 but haven’t really 
gotten anywhere. A reason for this is the difficulties in establishing the framework for the 
negotiations in terms of participation. For example, the EU has no intention of negotiating on 
free trade with Myanmar, against which it has economic sanctions. ASEAN, on the other 
hand, demands that Myanmar is allowed to join in a later phase of the agreement.252 In 
conjunction with the crisis in Myanmar in 2007, the Malaysian trade minister stated on the 
ASEAN-EU FTA that: “Negotiations must be free of political meddling and a constructive 
engagement is a better way to persuade military-ruled Myanmar to open up”.253 The possible 
value-based conflicts are not limited to the Myanmar issue - the Malaysian New Economic 
Policy that favours ethnic Malay politically and economically, has also been a source of 
European critique (albeit not officially). A European envoy to Malaysia stated that the 
discriminatory policy is protectionist and might hamper the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations.254 
Malaysia answered by sending an official protest to the EU over the official’s remark, 
contending that it "was tantamount to interfering in Malaysia’s domestic affairs and 
policies".255 Hence, diverging views on human rights and democracy and their connection to 
issues of non-interference and trade can affect the FTA negotiations.  
 
Having looked at different aspects of EU-ASEAN cooperation, it is evident that differences in 
constituting values and the ways in which these are promoted can affect the relations between 
the regions in a time when the areas of cooperation deepens and widens. Whereas the EU 
human rights diplomacy is considered intrusive by ASEAN, the association is itself 
susceptible to accusations of being lenient towards serious human rights offenders. The 
conflicts that have arisen have to a great extent regarded Myanmar, but the forthcoming FTA 
and PCA negotiations might put a finger on other contentious areas, especially if the EU 
insists on conditioning trade concessions and development aid on compliance with its values. 
However, the possible conflicts should not be exaggerated. There are substantial economic 
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and strategic gains for both ASEAN and EU in deepening their partnership and it is thus in all 
parties’ interest to overcome existing differences. First and foremost, the EU is not 
necessarily as stark as sometimes depicted, but has, as outlined above with regard to labour 
standards and free trade, a more nuanced approach. The EU is also capable of flexibility (or 
inconsistency for those who wish) depending on the counterpart, as demonstrated by its 
relations with China where “constructive engagement” has been deployed rather than 
confrontation and conditionality. Furthermore, ASEAN has generally toned down the Euro-
sceptic rhetoric and has included several of the EU core values in its own Charter. The rapid 
economic development that is taking place in several of the ASEAN member states and the 
general shift in economic powers from Europe to Asia make the negotiations more equal. 
Hence, it will be hard for a party to one-sidedly impose their standards. Certainly, there is a 
limit for the acceptance of each other’s differences, where external condemnation might be 
important for internal legitimacy. This seems to be the case with the EU stand on Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, given the mutual wish to maintain and develop good relations, more serious 
conflicts between ASEAN and the EU with regard to differences in the values they 
encompass should be able to be contained through flexibility and concessions on both sides.     
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